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I. The traditional transport prohlem and its macroeconomic variations 
in socialist transport 
The transport problem of operation research concerns in its already 
traditional form the optimal solution of the transportation of identical com-
modities or of properly interchangeable articles from seyeral forwarding places 
usually to eyen more destinations on the condition (so-called secondary 
condition) that in the transportation period in question eyery place of destina-
tion should receive at least as many goods as intended to be sent to it, and 
also that the amount of goods planned to be fOl"'i\-arded from the forwarding 
places should not exceed their forwarding capacity. By optimality is usually 
meant the minimum magnitude of the total costs of the whole handling of 
goods. The problem can be easily solved by means of the model of linear pro-
gramming in accordance ·with the rules of matrix algebra if the mentioned 
inequalities of the secondary conditions, or perhaps their equalities are linear 
in the transported quantities of relations (relations of the route of transport 
between forwarding place and destination) signifying the yariable (parameter 
of action) of the problem, and if the efficiency function or objectiye function 
expressing the total transport cost in function of the yariables is also linear. 
Inasmuch as the latter is quadratic - as it often is -, generally the problem 
can be also solyed by means of the so-called quadratic programming. 
The transport problem outlined in the foregoing usually arises during 
the economic actiyity of microeconomic units. In fact, the point in question 
is the formation of an optimal yariation of the diyision of labour of transport. 
:Xamely, in what cast the transporting apparatuses of the relations should con-
nect the forwarding places and the places of destination so that the optimal 
criterion under the giyen conditionE (to which the non negative transported 
amount of goods of the relations also belongs) is fulfilled. 
The above-mentioned cast, or the question of traffic division is raised 
in a more comprehensive form within the framework of the national economy. 
Fo'!' example, which branch of transport (railway or motor lorry) should trans-
port the given categories of goods from the sender to the place of destination 
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in geographically determined directions, so that this entire actIvIty of the 
distribution of goods should be the most favourable for the national eCOll-
omv. 
This formulation of the transport problem is already macroeconomic, 
and it raises the very complex question of the optimal division of traffic among 
the railway, motor vehicle and the full range of transport branches. At the 
same time, it raisc5 the question of "transport competition" developing in the 
"market" of transport performances and the question of the so-called market 
equilibrium. It is just thi~ extension of the problem that suggests the appli-
cation of the models of economic strategy for the case of certain simpler varia-
tions of the macroeconomic problem. Prior to this. however, it is necessary to 
attempt the clarification of S0111e- internwc!iatf' question;;:, so that this central 
task tan he at lcaEl approached. 
2. The interpretation of the decision preference function 
from the point of view of transport and the derivation 
of tIle partnneter Iuatrix 
In its introduction. 30111e que"tion~ arising alrpudy in the microeconomic 
forms of appearance of the transport prohll"11l havp to he clarified. Such 
a question is first of all ho'\- the prefel'eEc\' system of the dpcisioll maker, or 
more concretcly its optim al criterion of deci"ion influence;:: the cktPl'mination 
of the elements of the parameter matrix of importai1e,~ for the model of linear 
progran.l111ing. Generally .. it directly goyerns t·,,\-O rn ain factors: a) the linearity 
of the objecti,-e function, b) its economic. or mu]'" exactly national economic 
acceptability. As we shaH see it later. in case of certain optimal criteria the 
linearity of the efficiency function i:3 t'llsured, it cloe~ not invoh-c ",ucll high 
"price" that would compromise the serviceability of tll(' optimal criterion for 
the national economy. In other cases, unfortunately, the "price" il1voh-ed lllay 
risk to loose even the serionSIH'SS of thc programming. The cm'e is even worst' 
if neither the linearity, nor the ser....-iceability of the model for the national 
economy is guaranteed any longer. 'C nfortunately_ evell ;;:ueh programming 
experiment::; ha,-e occurred. Their fil~clings huye not heen used for practical 
planning. 
In the new system of economic management the enterprises arc entitled 
- bctween certain limits - to huild up their optimal actiyitics and optimal 
decisions so as they consider proper and praeticahle. \\'ith the transport tariff" 
applied as elements of the cost matrix, th(' programming dilemma detailed in 
the following arises. The question hecomes more complicated if the transport-
ing enterprises grant tariff reductions with a yiew to acquire markets, and they 
even compete with these. Then the prohlem hecomes that of macroeconomic 
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transport as a rule, for the solution of which the otherwise very useful model 
of linear programming no longer provides enough support, and it might be 
necessary to make use of some modelE' of mathematical game theory. 
3. The programming of the "transporter" and the derivation 
of the elements of the cost matrix 
The elements of the cost matrix in the solution of the problems of operative 
and long-range traffic dil'isiol1. The related microeconomic problems. 
'Vc have seen that the derivation of the elements of the parameter 
matrix deYelops according to the preference system of the progranlIner. And 
the preference "ystem, the optimal critC'rion of efficiency is often determined 
in depC'ndenc:e of "who a;'e the clecisionll1ak,'r and the programmer, re5pecti"\"(~ly. 
Inasmuch as as it is OftC'll the cast' - the transporter is the transporting 
enterprise (e.g. the Hungarian State HaihnlYs), it is ohyious that the trans-
pOl'tations, i.e. the loeomotivl' 0Iwrations of the railways should he programmed 
on the hasis of the rninimization of total operating eost;;, In operative conditions 
it is obyious that the programming ;:;houid he ha:=;ed on the average yariahle 
eost:3. p:>rhaps on the so-calleel are-marginal cosls. In long-range planning, 
,dwl1 in fact the (>11 terprise posses;;e5 a great many al'tiol1 parameters. it is 
conduciye to hase the programming on total spt·eific costs. Both types of eost 
haye the great adyantage that they may be differentiated aeeordil1g to rela-
tions. and the programming can he ha;:ed on the conerete costs of the relations, 
which is in the la:=;t analysis the "ideal" programming case. 
Howeyer. this pleasure is soon marrpd by the mieroeconomic e08t law 
that the magnitude of the unit costs (of both total and marginal cost:=;) is not 
il1d('pendent of the load, or nE the traffic ,1t>i1sity of the relations, of thc line. 
As a matt!'r of fact, that ,>mharrassing ease ensues "when the elements of the 
paramf"ter matrix depend on the enrrespondillg elements of the transport 
matrix and of the eomhination matrix, eonsequently on the variables of the 
problem. 
Fortunately, this rP}ation~hip i::: mch that its total cost function illyolyes 
quadratic yaTiabli~s. So, the quadratic pTogramming may still render us help. 
The transporter, howeyer, may use oth(Cr alloeation concepts ill the pro-
gramming as welL so, for example, the route It'ngth. the running time. etc. 
4. The programming of the "sender" and the forwarder 
and the derivation of the tariff matrix 
In this case, the cost of transportation deYdops linearly with the tariffs, 
and the sender has to consider it from thi" a5pect. The operating transport 
costs of thl' transporting enterprise are UnklHnQl to him, and they arc of no 
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interest to him either because his calculations are debited with the tariff itcms. 
The cost matrix of the linear transport programming is transformed into a so-
called tariff matrix. Yet, this would not make difficulties in itself, in fact, 
however, transport tariffs in the given commodity groups - and in that type 
of transport - depend only on the distance of transportation, but they no 
longer depend on the load of the relations. It is a practice accepted almost all 
over the world (perhaps France is an exception) that tariff unit rates are uni-
form on a nation-wide basis, while actual transport costs are differentiated, at 
least according to the load of relations, but obviously according to the magni-
tude of resistances of transport dynamics as ... ;v-ell, which greatly depend on the 
line management of the relation. The matter is made more complicated by the 
fact that tariff costs do not differ equally from the transport operating costs 
of the relations in the different branches of transport. 
An even more complex case ensues if the sender is interested in the c.i.f. 
cost, when he 'will carry out a combined production and transport program-
ming. Namely, the price of the product (goods) might not reflect the regional 
social production cost of the commodity in its geographical differentiation. 
5. The order of magnitude of the differences heL"ween the results 
of the programming of the transporter and the sender 
The instrZlctive results of recent Soviet experiments relating to the subject. 
From the foregoing it is clear that the cost matrix and the tariff matrix 
brought to the level of the same prices or costs, resp., 'will not he identical. 
More exactly: the ensuing situation may he characterized hy the fact that the 
programming (objective function) results of the transporter and of the sender 
(considering the question on the level of prices, or on the level of operating 
costs) will considerahly differ. It is also evident that it is the programming 
hased on the tariff matrix which gives higher costs. In given cases, the differ-
ence, i.e. the extra co;;t may have considerahle valucs. The Ckrainian Academy 
of Sciences reccntly carried out experimental programming for sugar-he et 
just in order to determine this difference (quoted hy Professor Khanukov in 
his latest study). Accordingly, this extra cost may he as high a;; 20 per ccnt. 
The fact that the suhoptimum differs from the actual optimum to such a great 
extent, warns to caution in choosing the preference and the optimal criterion, 
otherw'ise even 'with the most precise mathematical programming - the 
national economy might suffer considerahle, unintentional losses. 
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6. The programming of the senders if the transporters may grant 
tariff reductions in order to influence the distribution of traffic~ with special 
regard to the magnitudes and variations of the tariff elasticities of the transport 
demand 
The programming of the sender may be considered feasible only if the 
elements of the cost matrix (e.g. transport charges) are given for him. This is 
evident in case of fixed tariffs. What happens, ho'wever, if e.g. the transporters 
compete by means of tariff reductions in order to secure the transport demand 
of the senders, or a part of it. In such cases the development of the outcome 
of the competition and the corresponding market 'balance have precedence 
over the actual transport prohlem. A reasonahle competition (as outlined) 
e.g. bet·ween the railway and the motor vehicles, might lead to considerahle 
reductions of the tariff level if the tariff elasticity of the transport demand 
:s\ > 1, so long as during the reduction of the tariff level :si > 1. As soon as 
IsJ < 1 (usually 'rith very low tariffs). there is no reason for continuing the 
competition. Considering that e.g. in the competition of thc two duopolists, 
the railway and the motor car, the case of programming occurs under quite 
uncertain circumstances for hoth, the models of economic strategy can mostly 
he applied succesfully to determine the state of equilihrium of the competition, 
consequently to determine the market situation the most favourahle for hoth 
of them. 
7. The equilibrium of the market of transport performances in case 
of a duopoly developing on the side of tl'ansport (supply of transport 
performance) 
The introduction of the goods traffic "allocation matrix" as the concept 
of the analogy of the payoff matrix of the models of economic strategy, with 
special regard to the differentiation of goods traffic from the viewpoint of 
transport technique, 
It is conducive to start with the simplest competition situation (omitting 
the ideal-free competition) namely when there are only two competitors in 
the market of transport performances, on the supply side. Let them he - for 
the sake of further simplification - the organization of railway transport 
(e.g. the Hungarian State Railways) and that of the commercial vehicle trans-
port (e.g. the Enterprise for Truck Transportation). According to our sup-
position, the competition consists in tariff reductions, consequently there is 
a so-called price competition. Since (within given categories of goods) the rail-
way comes into consideration as a competitor heyond a certain distance of 
transportation only [1], the competition is only for longer transportations than 
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this (Fig. 1). As much as the motor car acquires in the course of the competition 
(expressed by the weight of goods, Q), just as much is lost hy the railway. 
WelL the motor car takes away the traffic from it. In fact, the struggle of the 







persons 'where the rules of the game are trr'leH hy the mode~ of tariff rC'duction. 
This may he step,,'ise. In such a case cl gamc consisting of a finite numhd' of 
strategic:" totalling zero come:" into heing. The tariff reduction - in principl(' 
- may he carried out hy infinitely small '\'aiuei', conseqm'n.tly it i", eontinuou;; 
in principle, WlWll the Sl't of tll(' competition strategies is infinite. Thi:" is th(' 
so-called infinite game. 
The elemE'nts of payoff matrix. or thost, of the game matrix includcd in 
the game theory represent the deliypred or H'c'~iYccl allocatf'd (Iuantities of 
goods, or perhaps the pertaining tariff incomes. For this Yi~ry reason this i5 
called alloeationmatrix. By this technicalmcans of mat he mati ea I game thcory. 
primaTily in case of duopoly, the optimum of twffic division and th" minimum 
of correspo!lding tariff lcvels can be determined hy means of suitabk assump-
tions. FOTtunatdv. in the c01llpetiti()l1 on land. in a 811ciali::,t economy thi5 
situation is ne·ar. 
3. The expected perspective formation of the equilihrium 
of traffic division in case of pure traffic allocation strategies 
In case of duopoly and in the application of so-callcd pure (this time, 
for the sake of sim.plicity, finite) strategies the elements of' the payoff ma enx 
and of the traffic diyisiol! matrix are rdatiych- easy to dctermine hy means 
.. , 
of th" point;; of intersection of the tariff lines expressed in the function of the 
distance of raih\-ay and motor ychicle transport. By tariff lines are meant, 
of course, the curycs hrought ahout by reductions of tariff In-cIs, and t11(>ir 
point of intersection is considered. In this case the traffie diyj;;ioll matrix is 
the following (Table 1), taking into consideration that with a low tariff leyei 
the yalue of the price income i;; grt>atly reduced. The clel11Ci,1t3 of the matrix 
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Table 1 
tlegrN'':: of tariff r£>dtH'tion 
II III IY 
degree8 I 3 0.5 0.1 0 -0.2 
0 of tariff II -1 2 0..1 0.1 
reduc- III ~ ! 1.S O.S 0.5 
tion IV 1 :5 1 0.3 0.2 
contain acquired and lost tariff income:;:, respectiyply. For the sake of simplic-
ity, the elcments of the matrix reflect orders of magnitudes. It can he seen 
from the matrix that the saddle point to Iw expected in the region of degree 
In is on the ha,;is of the principle of minimax or of mnximin a market 
equilibrium and a corre~ponding tariff ],'yel. On thi" JJasis the s"nder8 can 
already carry out the programmiilg. It is the qu('stion, hO\\-e-\-er. to what extent 
the tariff le-n'ls deYeloping in this manner corre8pond to the social costs of 
tran8Dortation. or how diffcl'entiated they show these reiation-honnd eost5. 
L • 
It can he concluded from the preliminary i!1Y('si iga tions accord in g to 
articles that in some cases a saddle point ,\-ill appear already at a lII-HI pair 
of strategy. In other cases thi", cannot Iw expected. ::\ a turally, th("~f' situations 
deYelop according to "what the tra,lf'port demand curyp of the article in qup:-tion 
is like. 
9. The expected formation of the equilihrium of traffic division 
in cai'e of nlixe(! traffic aHeeatlou strategies 
If in the case of the application of' pure maximin-minimax strategies no 
saddle point deYdops, the game totalling zero for two persons can still he 
soh-eel. This is madf' possihle by the application of the so-called mixed strategy, 
\\-hen the individual competitors assert their indi,-idual strategies with a 
determined relatiye frequency and prohability, each. The total amount of the 
relatiye frequency of thp app!ieatioll of the indiyidual strategies is, of course, 
pqual to the unit. By the methods of matrix cal('ulation - hy means of ratht'l' 
lengthy arithmetieal opf'rations a mixf'd strategy can he cktennined that 
slIits the maximin-minimax prineiple. consequently both parties. 
10. The problems and the possihilities of traffic division c<Iuilihdum 
in case of oligopolistic formations of the transport maI'ket 
In fact, there may be 1110re than two compf'titors in the market. The so-
called oligopolistic market is brought about in this manner. In such a case 
traffic diyisiol1 may he much more complieatC'd. To my knowl"dge, there are 
166 K.KADAS 
no strategic models available yet for this case that could be handled for prac-
tical purposes as well. It seems that the equilibrium model of price theory 
elaborated earlier for the case of a limited competition is suitable for this 
purpose. The problem becomes even more complicated, if the products can be 
hardly substituted. 
11. A comparison of the formation of the social costs 
of transportations in case of different traffic division programmes, 
'With special regard to the possihilities of combined production-
transport programmings 
Bearing in mind the foregoing, the total transportations can be effected 
most economically for the national economy only if their programme is elabo-
rated on the basis of the social costs of relations. In case of programming on 
the basis of transport tariffs, already 10 to 20 per cent or even 30 per cent 
extra costs may occur, even if these tariffs are so-called competition tariffs, 
simply because tariffs generally pay no regard e.g. to the load of relations. 
The situation is different if the sender performs a combined production-
transport programming. In such a case the objective is a common minimum 
of production and transport costs. 
It is obvious that this common minimum generally does not coincide 
with the minimum of transport costs. That is, in case of the combined pro-
duction-transport programming the social economic cost of transportations 
will be also higher than for a programming hased on the relation costs. Inves-
tigations carried out so far indicate that this difference is generally of the order 
of 5 to 10 per cent. The outlined phenomenon belonging to the sphere of the 
reduction of costs of a compensating character manifests itself in an even more 
complex form in production-storage-transport programmings. 
Summary 
The macroeconomic version of the traditional microeconomic transport problem i 
raised by the distribution of transport tasks among the transport branches. The optimur 
solution depends considerably on the kind of optimum criterion applied in programmin~ I 
on the existence of a competition among the transport branches and on the character of th 
latter. Thus, programming on the basis of the cost,. of transportation of relations giyes bette 
results from the point of yiew of the national economy than programming on the hasis ' I 
tariffs because these are less differentiated territorially. In case of a duopolistie competiti( 
between the transport branches, the market equilibrium can be obtained by means of mod! 
of economic strategy ill case of both pure and mixed strategies. In case of an oligopolisl I 
competition this is more problematic. 
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